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Abstract
The Fourth Amendment prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures in crim-
inal investigations. The Supreme Court has interpreted this to require that police
obtain a warrant prior to search and that illegally seized evidence be excluded from
trial. A consensus has developed in the law and economics literature that tort li-
ability for police officers is a superior means of deterring unreasonable searches.
We argue that this conclusion depends on the assumption of truth-seeking police,
and develop a game-theoretic model to compare the two remedies when some po-
lice officers (the bad type) are willing to plant evidence in order to obtain convic-
tions, even though other police (the good type) are not (where this type is private
information). We characterize the perfect Bayesian equilibria of the asymmetric-
information game between the police and a court that seeks to minimize error
costs in deciding whether to convict or acquit suspects. In this framework, we
show that the exclusionary rule with a warrant requirement leads to superior out-
comes (relative to tort liability) in terms of truth-finding function of courts, be-
cause the warrant requirement can reduce the scope for bad types of police to
plant evidence.
We would like to thank Tue Gorgens and Eli Wald for helpful discussions, and
seminar participants at the University of Connecticut for valuable comments.
1) Introduction 
The prosecution of criminal defendants is a process fraught with uncertainty, and requires 
a delicate balance between the search for the truth, and the protection of citizens’ right to be free 
from unreasonable invasions of their privacy. An important legal safeguard in this context is the 
Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, which provides that “The right of the people to be 
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, 
shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause…” (U.S. Const., 
Amendment IV). The Supreme Court has interpreted this amendment to require that police, when 
feasible, obtain a warrant prior to search, which a judge will only issue on a finding of probable 
cause (the “warrant requirement”), and further, that any illegally obtained evidence will be 
excluded from trial (the “exclusionary rule”).1 
Scholars have vigorously debated the desirability of these remedies for violations of the 
Fourth Amendment.  A major focus of the debate has been on the relative merits of the warrant 
requirement and exclusionary rule on the one hand, and a reasonableness standard enforced by 
tort liability for the government or its agents on the other. Amar (1997, Chapter 1), for example,  
argues that the plain language of the Fourth Amendment does not require warrants, probable 
cause, or exclusion of evidence, but only that searches and seizures be reasonable.  Further, the 
courts, in recognizing the impracticality of the warrant requirement in many contexts, have 
historically granted many exceptions to it (for example, use of metal detectors in airports).  
Finally, Amar claims on historical grounds that the Framers themselves envisioned tort liability 
(in the form of a civil action for trespass) rather than exclusion as the principal remedy for 
unlawful seizures of evidence. 
Posner (1981) has also argued for replacement of the exclusionary rule with tort liability, 
based however on economic rather than textual or historical considerations. As noted above, the 
primary objective of rules against unreasonable search is to balance citizens’ right to privacy 
against the goal of truth-seeking in criminal proceedings. Given this trade-off, economic 
efficiency requires that searches should be allowed up to the point where the expected probative 
value of the evidence being sought equals the harm to the victim of the search.2 Under such a 
                                                 
1 See, for example, Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383n (1914); and Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), which 
extended these provisions to the states. 
2 Formally, if B is the harm to the victim in terms of impaired privacy, p is the probability that evidence will be 
discovered that is decisive for conviction, and L is the social loss of not convicting the defendant, then a search is 
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standard, claims of an unlawful search would involve an ex post judicial determination of 
whether this condition was met at the time the search was conducted, in the same way that 
negligence is determined after the occurrence of an accident, with liability being assessed if it 
was not. 
According to this logic, the threat of tort liability forces the police to internalize the social 
costs and benefits of conducting a search. Some errors in their calculations will no doubt occur 
(just as some injurers are found negligent), but as long as they are acting in good faith (a point 
we expand on below), liability provides the correct incentives.3  Exclusion of evidence does not 
offer any further protection of privacy rights but only serves the interests of guilty defendants, 
which, it is claimed, are not meant to be protected by the Fourth Amendment (Posner, 1981; 
Amar, 1997). Moreover, it is argued that the exclusionary rule coupled with the warrant 
requirement will likely deter too many searches.4 
These arguments for the superiority of tort liability over the exclusionary rule, however, 
implicitly assume that police act in an essentially public-spirited manner. That is, police seek to 
uncover the truth in their role as evidence gatherers. At worst, they place too small a weight on 
the costs imposed on innocent suspects who are searched, and this overzealousness may result in 
Fourth Amendment violations. However, tort liability will induce them to internalize these social 
costs. Unfortunately, as suggested by a number of recent police scandals in major US cities, the 
motivations of police may not always be quite so benign.5 In particular, when police seek to 
maximize the number of convictions they obtain, there may be some officers who have an 
incentive and opportunity to plant evidence on innocent suspects in an effort to frame them. Even 
                                                                                                                                                             
justified on economic grounds (and hence is reasonable) if B < pL (see Posner (1998, pp. 748-750), and U.S. v. 
Carroll Towing, 159 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1947), which established the so-called Hand test for negligence).  For a more 
general economic analysis of the law of evidence, see Posner (1999). 
3 Of course, there are many practical problems with a system of tort liability. There may, for instance, be agency 
problems if individual officers are immune from liability. However, this could be corrected by subjecting officers to 
dismissal, loss of pay, or criminal sanctions for violations. Another problem is the difficulty in measuring the 
damages from an illegal search (Stuntz, 1991). 
4 To see why, note that if probable cause is interpreted to mean “more likely than not,” then a search warrant will 
only be issued if p>.5, whereas the reasonableness standard would allow searches if p>B/L. Probable cause will 
therefore result in overdeterrence whenever B/L<p<.5, which will be true when the intrusion (B) is small but the 
value of the evidence (L) is large, a fairly common circumstance. 
5 These include the “Sheetrock” scandal in Dallas (e.g. P. Duggan, “‘Sheetrock’ Scandal Hits Dallas Police: Cases 
Dropped, Officers Probed after Cocaine ‘Evidence’ Turns out to be Fake” Washington Post, Jan. 18, 2002) and the 
“Ramparts” scandal in Los Angeles (e.g. M. Lait and S. Glover, “2 Ex-Officers Accused of Evidence Planting” Los 
Angeles Times, Oct. 21, 2000). 
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if this practice is rare, it can seriously compromise the ability of courts to distinguish the 
innocent from the guilty. 
This paper analyzes Fourth Amendment remedies - comparing tort liability and the 
exclusionary rule – in circumstances where a subset of police officers are willing to plant 
evidence. We argue that a system based on tort liability is unlikely to deter such police 
misbehavior (as opposed to good faith errors). This is because, while the purported search that 
uncovered the “evidence” was presumably unreasonable before the fact (because the suspect is, 
after all, truly innocent), as a practical matter courts will generally not be able to distinguish 
planted from legitimate evidence after the fact. On the other hand, the exclusionary rule (and in 
particular, the warrant requirement) requires police to present some evidence of guilt to a 
presumably impartial judge prior to conducting the search.6 While this does not eliminate the 
possibility that evidence will be planted, it greatly reduces the threat of false convictions because 
the police will only be able to search a small subset of suspects whose probability of guilt 
surpasses the threshold required for the issue of a warrant.7 In this way, the exclusionary rule 
enhances the ability of courts to convict the guilty and acquit the innocent while protecting the 
privacy rights of citizens. 
The major contribution of this paper is thus to identify and analyze a set of circumstances 
in which the exclusionary rule (and in particular, the warrant requirement) leads to superior 
outcomes compared to a system that relies solely on tort liability as a remedy for Fourth 
Amendment violations. This result is important, firstly, because it challenges the consensus 
among law–and–economics scholars, and increasingly among scholars of constitutional criminal 
procedure, in favor of tort liability (Posner, 1981; Amar, 1997). Secondly, it provides a possible 
explanation of a long-standing puzzle in the economic approach to the law of evidence. Despite 
the apparently greater efficiency of tort liability (as claimed in the literature discussed above), 
the warrant requirement and exclusionary rule are well-established features of criminal 
procedure. Established for Federal criminal proceedings in 1914 (Weeks), the exclusionary rule 
remedy had been adopted by about half of US states by 1961, when it was made mandatory by 
                                                 
6 Of course, this assumes that judges are more trustworthy than police officers, a point emphasized by Stuntz (1991). 
Also, it is not crucial to this argument whether warrants are issued on the basis of probable cause, or based on the 
reasonableness standard discussed earlier; efficiency considerations would, however, favor the latter. 
7 Posner (1981, p. 54) notes that the exclusionary rule will not deter a different sort of police malfeasance: searches 
conducted purely for harassment. Such searches are not the subject of this paper (see the discussion in Section 6.3). 
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Mapp.8 The widespread use of this approach and its longevity clearly stand in need of 
explanation from an economic standpoint.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly reviews the related 
literature. Then, Section 3 presents the basic model, which consists of an asymmetric information 
game between police and the court.  Police care only about maximizing the probability of a 
conviction less the cost of search, but they come in two types: “good” (those unwilling to plant 
evidence), and “bad” (those willing to plant evidence). After an arrest, the court seeks to deliver 
the correct verdict but is uncertain about the reliability of the evidence presented by the arresting 
officer. This creates a trade-off between type I and type II errors which, given the court’s 
objective of minimizing error costs, defines the efficient “threshold of reasonable doubt.”  We 
initially characterize the equilibria of this model in the absence of remedies for Fourth 
Amendment violations. Then, in Section 4 we incorporate tort liability and show that this remedy 
provides no additional deterrence against planting evidence compared to the basic model. In 
contrast, Section 5 shows that an exclusionary rule with a warrant requirement does increase 
deterrence, thereby lowering the probability that an innocent defendant will be convicted and 
raising social welfare. Section 6 considers a number of extensions, while Section 7 discusses the 
implications and concludes. 
 
2) Related Literature 
 There is a very large literature within legal scholarship that addresses Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence (as discussed, for example, in Stuntz (1991) and Amar (1997)). There is also a 
substantial economic literature on civil procedure, but little formal modeling of issues in criminal 
procedure. Exceptions include Miceli (1991) on the optimal standard of proof in criminal trials, 
Schrag and Scotchmer (1994) on the effects of rules excluding character evidence from criminal 
trials, and Seidmann and Stein (2000) and Seidmann (2003) on the Fifth Amendment privilege 
against self-incrimination. On a related issue, Daughety and Reinganum (1995) examine the 
effects of rules excluding the admission of evidence about pretrial settlement negotiations in civil 
trials. The production of evidence by parties in trials has also been modeled, for instance, in 
Daughety and Reinganum (2000) and Sanchirico (2000), while the impact of plea bargaining on 
                                                 
8 See Atkins and Rubin (2003, Appendix A, p. 174) for a list of these states. A number of other countries, including 
Canada, Australia, Germany and Italy, use a discretionary exclusionary rule (p. 161). 
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trial outcomes and social welfare has also attracted some attention (Grossman and Katz, 1983; 
Reinganum, 1988).  
 Also related is the literature on corruption and wrongful conduct by the police and other 
law enforcement agencies (e.g. Bowles and Garoupa, 1997), including models in which police 
may extract bribes from innocent parties in exchange for not making false arrests (e.g. Polinsky 
and Shavell, 2001). In the model of this paper, in contrast, police are motivated not by monetary 
gain per se, but by a desire for convictions. Benoit and Dubra (2003) develop a model that 
analyzes why police officers who engage in wrongful conduct may be protected by those who do 
not (for instance, through a refusal by the latter to testify against the former), which can explain, 
for example, why the “bad” types may be able to survive. Finally, Atkins and Rubin (2003) 
empirically investigate the effects of Mapp on crime rates, an issue not addressed in the current 
paper. 
 
3) The Basic Model 
This section describes the basic model of strategic interaction between two actors – a 
police officer (hereafter denoted P) and a criminal court (denoted C) – in the absence of either an 
exclusionary rule (ER) or a system of tort liability (TL) for Fourth Amendment violations (the 
game described here will be denoted Γ0). The equilibria of Γ0 are then derived and discussed. 
The notation employed in the model in this and subsequent sections is summarized in Table 1. 
[Table 1 about here] 
3.1) Description of the Game 
The game Γ0 is a dynamic game with asymmetric information; it can be divided into four 
stages – investigation, search, arrest and trial. The information asymmetry arises because P can 
be one of two types, where P’s type is denoted θ є {Good, Bad}. P is privately informed about 
her type (which is unobservable to C, and also to the other actors who are introduced in later 
sections). The two types of P differ not (as in standard asymmetric information games) in their 
payoffs (described below), but rather in the set of actions available to them. The “bad” type of P 
(denoted PB) can “plant” evidence on suspects in order to “frame” them, whereas the “good” type 
of P (denoted PG) is assumed not to have this option available. While C cannot observe a 
particular P’s type, it is common knowledge that a fraction β є (0, 1) of the population from 
which P is drawn are of the “bad” type. 
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In the first stage of the game, P chooses whether or not to expend effort investigating a 
crime (in reality, the choice of whether to investigate may not be made by an individual police 
officer; the choice in this game can, however, be regarded as the choice of a level of effort to 
exert, with a low level being normalized to zero). The choice is denoted by J є {0, 1}, where J = 
1 if P investigates, and J = 0 if P does not. Regardless of her type, P incurs an effort cost k > 0 
from investigating (and 0 cost from not doing so). If P investigates, “probable cause” (interpreted 
here as evidence of guilt that exceeds some given threshold) is found against a particular suspect 
with some probability φ є (0, 1). The event that probable cause is found is denoted F (so that 
Pr[F | J = 1] = φ). Note that the terminology of “probable cause” is used here to reflect current 
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence; however, nothing in the formal analysis below would change 
if the evidence of guilt that exceeds some given threshold were interpreted instead as some form 
of “reasonableness” standard (this would presumably involve a lower threshold, and hence φ 
would be higher, but as long as the assumption A1-A3 below hold, the results would be 
unaffected). 
The next stage of the game involves P deciding whether to search a suspect. If P has 
investigated at the previous stage and found probable cause against a particular suspect, then, if P 
searches that suspect, there is a probability g that dispositive evidence is found establishing that 
suspect’s guilt. The event that this evidence is found is denoted G. Note that g is a conditional 
probability, conditioned on probable cause having previously been found against that particular 
suspect (i.e. Pr[G | F] = g). However, P is not restricted to searching only suspects against whom 
probable cause exists. Rather, P can also choose to search any other potential suspect (even 
without having chosen to investigate in the first stage of the game). However, it is assumed that, 
prior to investigation, there is a continuum of potential suspects. Thus, the probability that P 
finds the guilty party by searching some individual chosen at random is zero (the probability that 
probable cause is found against such an individual is also assumed to be zero). Formally: 
A1: Pr[G | J = 0] = Pr[G | (J = 1) and (not F)] = Pr[F | J = 0] = 0 
The choice of whether to search is denoted S є {0, 1}, where S = 1 if P searches, and S = 0 if P 
does not. A search involves an effort cost s > 0.  
An important feature of this stage of the game is that PB (but not PG) can choose to plant 
evidence on a suspect. The choice of whether to arrest is denoted R є {0, 1}, where R = 1 if PB 
plants, and R = 0 if PB does not plant. For PB, planting evidence entails a positive effort cost 
 6
denoted by ρ, where ρ є (0, s]. That is, the planting of evidence requires some effort on the part 
of the bad type of police officer, but (weakly) less than would be entailed by a genuine search. 
 In the next stage, P decides whether to arrest a suspect. This can be a suspect against 
whom first probable cause, and then dispositive evidence of guilt, was found; however, P is also 
able to arrest any other potential suspect. The choice of whether to arrest is denoted A є {0, 1}, 
where A = 1 if P arrests, and A = 0 if P does not arrest. If a suspect is arrested, then there is a 
trial; otherwise, the game ends. If there is a trial, C decides whether to convict or acquit the 
suspect (see below for a description of C’s role; the timing of the game is summarized in Figure 
1). Thus, the strategy set for P can be represented as follows: for PG, the available strategies 
(denoted σG) can be summarized by a 3-tuple {JG; SG; AG}, while for PB, the available strategies 
(denoted σB) can be summarized by a 4-tuple {JB; SB; RB; AB} (in each case, S, R, and A can be 
conditioned on factors such as the discovery of probable cause or of evidence of guilt). 
[Figure 1 about here] 
Clearly, there are many feasible strategies for each type of P. Many of these, however, 
are strictly dominated. For example, consider the following strategy for PG: {J = 1; S = 0; A = 0} 
(i.e. investigating, but never searching or arresting). This gives a payoff of – k, and so is strictly 
dominated by {J = 0; S = 0; A = 0} i.e. a strategy of not entering, which gives a payoff of 0. 
Similarly, consider the following strategy for PB: {J = 1; S = 0; R = 1; A = 1} (i.e. investigating, 
and then always planting and arresting). PB’s payoff can be raised by k by switching to {J = 0; S 
= 0; R = 1; A = 1} i.e. planting and arresting without investigating. In addition to eliminating 
strictly dominated strategies, the following (innocuous) restriction on P’s strategies is imposed: 
any strategy that involves arresting a suspect when no evidence (whether real or planted) exists is 
ruled out. Allowing strategies of this type would not change any of the equilibria derived below, 
as C can infer from a trial where there is no (real or purported) evidence against the suspect that 
the suspect is innocent, and would thus always acquit. 
Imposing this restriction, and eliminating strictly dominated strategies, essentially leaves 
the following strategies for PG: 
{J = 0; S = 0; A = 0} (i.e. not entering the game) 
{J = 1; S = 1 | F, S = 0 | not F; A = 1 | F and G, A = 0 otherwise} (i.e. investigating, 
searching only if probable cause is found, and arresting only if evidence of guilt is 
found). 
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PB can play counterparts of these strategies – i.e. 
 {J = 0; S = 0; R = 0; A = 0} 
 {J = 1; S = 1 | F, S = 0 | not F; R = 0; A = 1 | F and G, A = 0 otherwise} 
and can also play: 
 {J = 0; S = 0; R = 1; A = 1} (i.e. plant evidence and arrest) 
These are the strategies that will be considered in deriving the equilibria below. 
P’s payoff can be expressed as: 
u =I – Jk – Ss – Rρ                            (1) 
where I = 1 if a conviction is obtained and I = 0 if not (this applies whether or not there is a trial 
– i.e. if there is no trial, or if there is a trial and the suspect is acquitted, then I = 0).9 Because the 
payoff from a conviction is normalized to 1, the costs of investigation, search and planting are 
measured relative to the (gross) payoff from obtaining a conviction. It should also be borne in 
mind that R is always zero for PG given the assumptions about the available strategy sets. Thus, 
the basic assumptions here are simply that P cares about obtaining convictions, and (negatively) 
about the effort costs of investigation and search.  
Some restrictions on the cost parameters are required to focus attention on the 
“interesting” cases. Suppose that PG plays the strategy σG = {J = 1; S = 1 | F, S = 0 | not F; A = 1 
| F and G, A = 0 otherwise} (i.e. investigating, searching only if probable cause is found, and 
arresting only if evidence of guilt is found). Then, the ex ante probability of obtaining a 
conviction is φg. Assuming that P is risk-neutral (which does not affect any of the basic results), 
the expected payoff is: 
φg – k –φs                                        (2) 
when C convicts. Unless this is positive, PG will never choose to investigate, even when 
conviction is anticipated if evidence is found against a suspect. Thus, it is assumed that: 
A2: φ(g – s) – k > 0 
Note also that φ(g – s) – k < 1, as φ and  g  are both probabilities.  
Similarly, the model is uninteresting if PB never has an incentive to plant evidence (even 
when C is expected to convict). Suppose that PB plays the strategy σB = {J = 0; S = 0; R = 1; A = 
1}, and C convicts. Then, PB receives a payoff of (1 – ρ). For PB to play strategy σB, not only 
                                                 
9 A cost to P of arresting a suspect who is subsequently acquitted could be incorporated into the analysis without 
affecting the basic results. 
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must it be true that ρ < 1, but ρ must also be sufficiently small that PB has no incentive to deviate 
and play PG’s strategy (of undertaking a genuine investigation rather than planting evidence). 
Thus, it is assumed that: 
A3: ρ < 1 – (φ(g – s) – k) 
 C’s strategy set consists simply of the decision to convict or acquit the suspect, in the 
event that there is a trial: i.e. σC = {Convict, Acquit}. Recall that C does not observe P’s type; 
thus, if there is a trial, C must form some belief about P’s type (and hence about the suspect’s 
guilt). This belief is denoted by µ, where µ = Pr[θ = Good]. Recall that the prior belief is based 
on the knowledge that the fraction of good types in the population of police officers is 1 – β; the 
updated belief is formed using Bayes’ Rule whenever possible. C’s payoff reflects a desire to 
reach the correct verdict (i.e. to convict guilty suspects and acquit innocent ones), combined with 
a tradeoff between Type I and Type II errors. If there is a trial, C’s payoff is: 
  
 acquit) (guilty, if )1(
convict) (innocent, if 
convict) (guilty,or  acquit) (innocent, if 0



−−
−=
q
quC                          (3) 
(this follows the formulation in Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1998), and has previously been used 
in the literature – e.g. Dharmapala and McAdams (2003); Seidmann (2003)).  
The parameter q captures the disutility from wrongly convicting an innocent suspect; the 
higher is q, the greater the disutility. Thus, q reflects the threshold of “reasonable doubt” that is 
required for conviction; it is assumed that q є (1/2, 1). Given a belief µ that the suspect is guilty, 
the expected payoff to C from convicting is µ(q - 1), whereas the expected payoff to acquitting is 
q(µ – 1), Hence, this payoff function implies that C will convict whenever µ > q (as a tiebreaking 
assumption, suppose that C acquits when indifferent). If a trial does not take place, then (because 
it is implicitly assumed that a crime has taken place, so that the lack of a trial implies that the 
perpetrator has not been found) C is assumed to receive an arbitrary strictly negative payoff, 
equal to – v (where v > 0). 
Note that it is possible to consider the above payoff function as characterizing not only 
C’s utility, but also as representing one aspect of social welfare (as in Grossman and Katz (1983) 
and Reinganum (1988), where social welfare is equated with the payoff of the jury). That is, the 
court’s tradeoff between Type I and Type II errors can be viewed as representing society’s 
preferences over these two kinds of miscarriages of justice. Of course, a full welfare analysis 
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would have to consider other kinds of costs and benefits (such as the level of crime, resources 
expended on trials, the utility of the police) that are beyond the scope of this paper. Thus, we 
generally refer to the court’s payoff, rather than to social welfare; however, the broader 
interpretation should be borne in mind. 
 3.2) Equilibria 
 In the game described above, there always exists what we term a “passive” pooling 
equilibrium, where neither type of P investigates. This is supported by out-of-equilibrium beliefs 
that would lead C to acquit, in the event that a trial was to occur. Formally: 
Proposition 1: Γ0 has a “passive” perfect Bayesian pooling equilibrium, where the equilibrium  
strategies are: 
   σG* = {J = 0; S = 0; A = 0} 
   σB* = {J = 0; S = 0; R = 0; A = 0} 
   σC* = Acquit 
  C’s beliefs are µ* є [0, q], and equilibrium payoffs are: 
   uG* = uB* = 0 and uC* = - v 
Proof: To show that this is an equilibrium: given the equilibrium strategy profile for P, there is 
no trial in equilibrium, so C’s beliefs are unconstrained by Bayes’ Rule. Thus, µ* є [0, q] is 
admissible. Given these beliefs, C’s payoff is maximized by acquitting if a trial occurs (recall 
that C convicts whenever µ > q). Given C’s beliefs and equilibrium strategy, suppose that PG 
deviates by investigating, thereby incurring a cost of either k or, if the investigation leads to a 
search, (k+s). As C acquits, and k > 0 and s > 0, PG’s deviation payoff will be strictly negative, 
whereas uG = 0 in equilibrium. Given C’s beliefs and equilibrium strategy, suppose that PB 
deviates by planting evidence, thereby incurring a cost of ρ. As C acquits, and ρ > 0, PB’s 
deviation payoff will be strictly negative, whereas uB = 0 (a similar argument holds if PB deviates 
by investigating rather than planting). Thus, this is an equilibrium. End of Proof. 
 
Now, suppose that both types of P enter the game. Then, under the assumptions made 
above, PB will always plant evidence, while PG will investigate and only pursue an arrest if 
evidence of guilt is found. Thus, there will be two kinds of cases brought to trial – those in which 
P is of the good type and the suspect is guilty, and those in which P is of the bad type, and the 
suspect is innocent. The court thus has to infer the probability that a given suspect is guilty. Note 
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that the court cannot simply use the prior belief that a fraction (1 – β) of police officers are of the 
good type, as there is some probability that PG does not find probable cause and/or evidence of 
guilt, and so never arrests a suspect. The ex ante probability that PG ends up making an arrest is 
φg, so the fraction of police officers who are of the good type and make an arrest is (1 – β)φg. In 
contrast, PB always arrests someone, so the fraction of bad types who make arrests is simply β. 
Thus, when C is faced with a P who has arrested a suspect and is testifying at trial, the inferred 
probability that P is of the good type (and hence that the suspect is guilty) will be: 
βϕβ
ϕβ
+−
−
g
g
)1(
)1(                                                      (4) 
If this inferred probability exceeds q, then C will convict; otherwise, C will acquit. If C convicts, 
then a different kind of pooling equilibrium – one where both types of P enter the game – can be 
sustained. This “active” pooling equilibrium requires that the following condition: 
Condition 1: q
g
g >+−
−
βϕβ
ϕβ
)1(
)1(  
is satisfied. Thus, 
Proposition 2: Suppose that assumptions A1-A3 and Condition 1 hold. Then, Γ0 has an “active”  
perfect Bayesian pooling equilibrium, where the equilibrium strategies are: 
   σG* = {J = 1; S = 1|F, S = 0|not F; A = 1|G, A = 0|not G} 
   σB* = {J = 0; S = 0; R = 1; A = 1} 
   σC* = Convict 
  C’s beliefs are  
βϕβ
ϕβµ +−
−=
g
g
)1(
)1(*  
and the equilibrium (expected) payoffs are: 
   uG* = φ(g – s) – k 
uB* = 1 – ρ 
βϕβ
β
+−
−=
g
quC )1(
*  
Proof: Given the equilibrium strategy profile for P, the belief µ* is clearly correct (see the 
argument in the text). Given µ*, from Eq. (3), C’s expected payoff is given by: 
uC* = Pr[defendant is guilty].0 + Pr[defendant is innocent].(– q) 
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         = )(
)1(
q
g
−+− βϕβ
β  
which gives the equilibrium expected payoff uC* above i.e. uC* = – (1 – µ*)q. Thus, σC = 
Convict is optimal for C because the payoff from acquitting is 
  uC = Pr[defendant is guilty].( – (1 – q)) + Pr[defendant is innocent].(0) 
       = – (1 – q)µ* 
Condition 1 (i.e. µ* > q) implies that this is lower than uC*.  
In equilibrium, PG incurs the investigation cost k (as J = 1), and has probability φg of obtaining a 
conviction, while the search cost s is incurred with probability φ; this gives the equilibrium uG*. 
PB obtains a conviction with probability 1, while incurring only the planting cost ρ; this gives the 
equilibrium uB*. Given C’s beliefs µ* and strategy σC*, it is optimal for each type of P to play 
the equilibrium strategy. Consider a deviation by PG to a strategy σG = {J = 0; S = 0; A = 0}; this 
would lead to a payoff uG = 0, whereas the payoff from playing σG* is φ(g – s) – k > 0 (by A2). 
Consider a deviation by PB to a strategy σB = {J = 0; S = 0; R = 0; A = 0}; this would lead to a 
payoff of uB = 0, whereas the payoff from playing uB* is 1 – ρ > 0 (by A3). A deviation by PB to 
PG’s strategy (i.e. σB = {J = 1; S = 1|F, S = 0|not F; R = 0; A = 1|G, A = 0|not G}) would also not 
be profitable, as 1 – ρ > φ(g – s) – k (by A3). Thus, this is an equilibrium. End of Proof. 
 
In this equilibrium, C is willing to convict all defendants, even while inferring that a certain 
fraction of them (those who are arrested by P’s of the bad type) are factually innocent. 
 Finally, we show that there exist no separating equilibria (i.e. the court is never able to 
distinguish between the two types of police, given the information available): 
Proposition 3: Given the assumptions above, there exists no separating equilibrium of Γ0. 
Proof: Consider a candidate-equilibrium where PG enters and PB does not: 
   σG = {J = 1; S = 1|F, S = 0|not F; A = 1|G, A = 0|not G} 
   σB = {J = 0; S = 0; R = 0; A = 0} 
Given these strategies for P, C will infer that µ = 1, and hence will play σC = Convict. But, this is 
not an equilibrium, as PB has an incentive to deviate to σB = {J = 0; S = 0; R = 1; A = 1}, 
thereby receiving a payoff of (1 – ρ), which (by A3) is greater than the 0 payoff in the candidate-
equilibrium. 
 Consider a candidate-equilibrium where PB enters and PG does not: 
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   σG = {J = 0; S = 0; A = 0} 
   σB = {J = 0; S = 0; R = 1; A = 1} 
Given these strategies for P, C will infer that µ = 0, and hence will play σC = Acquit. But, this is 
not an equilibrium, as PB has an incentive to deviate to σB = {J = 0; S = 0; R = 0; A = 0}, 
thereby receiving a payoff of 0, whereas the payoff in the candidate-equilibrium is – ρ < 0. 
Hence, there can be no separating equilibrium. End of Proof. 
 
The intuition for the lack of a separating equilibrium is simply that, whenever a good type of P is 
willing to enter, entry is even more beneficial from the point of view of a bad type (recalling that 
the latter does not incur the investigation costs k, nor the difference between ρ and s). Thus, it is 
impossible for the good type of P to distinguish herself from the bad type. 
  
4) Introducing Tort Liability 
 In this section, we consider the imposition of tort liability on police officers for searches 
without probable cause. As discussed earlier, tort liability is the favored remedy for unlawful 
searches of many commentators on the Fourth Amendment, including Posner (1981) and Amar 
(1997). The introduction of tort liability involves adding another player, a civil court, denoted T. 
A suspect who has been searched can (costlessly) seek damages by filing suit. Note, however, 
that under the assumptions made above, PG never searches without probable cause (as the ex ante 
probability of success is zero).10 Thus, if a suspect has been searched but not arrested, it can be 
inferred by T that P was of the good type, and no damages will be awarded. Hence, we assume 
that only those suspects who are arrested (regardless of whether they are convicted) bring suit. T 
then decides whether to hold P liable or not: the strategy set is {Liable, Not liable}. If T 
determines that P is liable, then damages of D > 1 are assessed against P (we ignore any wealth 
constraints, and assume that D is paid personally by P). T’s payoff if there is a trial is analogous 
to C’s payoff: 
                                                 
10 Of course, this rules out an important class of cases where police may harass innocent individuals without seeking 
to frame them. In such instances, as Amar (1997) points out, the warrant requirement and exclusionary rule are 
irrelevant, while tort liability may deter the misconduct. The focus here, however, is not on this class of cases. 
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Here, t є [1/2, 1) captures the tradeoff between Type I and Type II errors in the sanctioning of 
police. Because civil trials only require a preponderance of evidence rather than a reasonable 
doubt standard, we would expect that t < q (however, this is not essential to the results below).  
As we assume that all criminal defendants file suit, the only circumstances in which no 
suits are filed are when there are no arrests and hence no violations (either there are no searches, 
or the only searches are carried out by the good type of P). Thus, when there is no suit, T’s 
payoff can be assumed to be 0 (again, this is not crucial to the results). If a suit is filed, T forms a 
belief by inferring the probability that a Fourth Amendment violation occurred (i.e. that P 
searched unreasonably). Because PG never has an incentive to commit such a violation, this 
probability is equal to the probability that P is of the bad type. This is simply the complement of 
C’s belief µ (and so will be denoted using the same notation). Of course, in equilibrium, the 
beliefs of C and T have to be mutually consistent. Note that T will find P liable whenever the 
belief that P is of the bad type exceeds the threshold t: i.e. (1 – µ) > t. The game with the added 
tort liability stage will be denoted ΓTL. 
In analyzing ΓTL, the first point to note is that a passive pooling equilibrium exists. In this 
equilibrium, C believes it is sufficiently likely that P is of the bad type that it is willing to acquit 
all defendants; in anticipation of this outcome, neither type of P enters. Because the prospect of 
acquittal deters entry by P, there are no searches. Hence, there is no possibility of unreasonable 
searches, and no civil suits are filed against the police. Consequently, the beliefs and actions of T 
(off the equilibrium path) do not affect the equilibrium specified in Proposition 1: 
Proposition 1´: ΓTL has a “passive” perfect Bayesian pooling equilibrium, identical to that 
characterized in Proposition 1; this exists regardless of T’s beliefs and strategy 
Proof: Straightforward. 
  
 Now suppose that Condition 1 is satisfied. That is, C believes that it is sufficiently likely 
that P is of the good type that it is optimal to convict all defendants. This induces both types of P 
to enter, and leads to the equilibrium specified in Proposition 2 above. When we add a civil court 
T to the model, suits will be filed by all defendants. Faced with deciding the outcome of a suit 
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against a police officer, T will infer the probability that the officer is of the bad type. Given the 
strategies of each type of P in the Proposition 1 equilibrium, T’s inference will be that P is bad 
with probability 1 – µ. C would only have convicted the defendant if µ > q, however, which 
implies that µ > ½ (recalling that q > ½ by assumption). This of course implies that 1 – µ > ½, 
and (as t ≥ ½ by assumption) that 1 – µ < t. That is, in any equilibrium where C is willing to 
convict (and hence P willing to enter), T’s optimal strategy will be to find the police officer not 
liable. Hence, the equilibrium outcomes are essentially unchanged from those of Proposition 2: 
Proposition 2´: Suppose that assumptions A1-A3 and Condition 1 hold. Then, ΓTL has an 
“active” perfect Bayesian pooling equilibrium, where the equilibrium strategies are: 
   σG* = {J = 1; S = 1|F, S = 0|not F; A = 1|G, A = 0|not G} 
   σB* = {J = 0; S = 0; R = 1; A = 1} 
   σC* = Convict 
   σT* = Not liable 
  C and T hold beliefs  
βϕβ
ϕβµ +−
−=
g
g
)1(
)1(*  
and the equilibrium payoffs are: 
   uG* = φg – k – φs 
uB* = 1 – ρ 
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Proof: Analogous to that for Proposition 2. Note that µ* > q > ½ implies that 1 – µ* < ½, so that 
1 – µ* < t. Hence, it is optimal for T to find P not liable, given the strategies σG*, σB*, and σC* 
To show this, consider a deviation by T to the alternative strategy, σT = Liable; given uT, the 
expected utility of “Not liable” is  
– tµ* – (1 – µ* - t) 
while the expected utility of “Liable” is – tµ*. As 1 – µ* < t, the expected utility from playing 
“Not liable” is higher. Note also that T’s equilibrium beliefs are correct given these strategies. 
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Given σC* and σT*, P’s strategy is optimal, while given the correct beliefs and P’s strategy, C’s 
strategy is optimal (see Proof of Proposition 2). Thus, this is an equilibrium. End of Proof. 
 
 Finally, as the creation of a tort liability regime does not in itself lead to any new 
information about police characteristics becoming available, there is no separating equilibrium: 
Proposition 3´: Given the assumptions above, there exists no separating equilibrium of ΓTL. 
Proof: Straightforward. 
 
 To summarize, the equilibrium outcomes of the game with tort liability are essentially 
identical to those in the basic game analyzed earlier. The introduction of tort liability makes no 
difference in our model because the only circumstances in which a police officer would be found 
liable are those in which C would not be willing to convict in any event. Under such conditions, 
police of both types are deterred from entering because C will not convict, and the existence of a 
tort liability system does not provide any additional deterrence of wrongful conduct by bad types 
of P. 
 
5) Introducing the Exclusionary Rule 
 This section returns to the basic game of Section 3, denoted Γ0, and introduces an 
alternative procedural regime that involves two new elements. The first is that, between the first 
and second stages of the game, P has the option of applying (costlessly) to a judge for a search 
warrant. This involves introducing a judge or magistrate as a new player, but for the sake of 
simplicity, he or she is assumed to be a nonstrategic player. The judge can observe whether or 
not probable cause was found in stage 1 against the suspect whom P seeks to search, and is 
assumed to issue a warrant if and only if probable cause was found. The second element is that, 
in the fourth stage of the game (the criminal trial), the court excludes any evidence that was 
(actually or allegedly) found in the absence of a search warrant. While this is admittedly a 
simplification, it is assumed that exclusion amounts to the acquittal of the defendant. These 
modifications to Γ0 are intended to represent in stylized form the major features of the line of 
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence established by Mapp, and this regime will be referred to as the 
exclusionary rule (ER) and denoted ΓER (although, as discussed in Section 6 below, the warrant 
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requirement is more crucial to the results than the exclusion of evidence per se). Under this 
regime, there is assumed to be no possibility of tort actions against P by suspects.  
 These changes to the game entail that P now faces a new choice of whether to apply for a 
search warrant or not. However, it turns out that, for both types of P, failing to apply when 
probable cause is found is always strictly dominated. Since failing to obtain a search warrant 
implies that the suspect is never convicted, any strategy for P that involves investigating and not 
applying for a search warrant is strictly dominated by a strategy that involves not investigating at 
all (as this saves the investigation cost k). Applying for a warrant when there has been no 
investigation, or when an investigation has failed to find probable cause, is pointless, given that 
magistrates can observe this, and never issue warrants in such circumstances. Thus, it can be 
assumed, without affecting the results, that a police officer always applies for a search warrant if 
and only if probable cause is found. It is important to stress that, because of the assumption that 
the magistrate who issues warrants can observe or verify whether or not probable cause was 
found, P cannot falsify the evidence used to obtain a search warrant. Moreover, there is no 
possibility of collusion between P and the magistrate. The effects of relaxing these assumptions 
are discussed in Section 6 below. 
 The court C also faces a new decision regarding whether to exclude evidence. It will be 
assumed, however, that it always does so if a search warrant is not produced at trial (and, 
moreover, a warrant cannot be successfully falsified by P). This assumption is made without loss 
of generality in this framework – it turns out that the only circumstances in which evidence 
would be excluded are those in which the court would disregard the evidence in any case because 
it is unreliable (i.e. has too high a probability of having been planted by a bad P). This is a 
consequence of the assumption that no good P ever commits a Fourth Amendment violation; as 
discussed earlier (as well as in Section 6 below), relaxing this assumption would only strengthen 
the paper’s results. Finally, the assumption of a nonstrategic magistrate is also without 
substantial loss of generality, as the most natural assumption concerning her objective function – 
that it is identical to that of C – would lead to essentially the same behavior as postulated above. 
 The new game ΓER, like those analyzed previously, has a passive pooling equilibrium 
where neither type of P enters. Recall that in the equilibrium of Proposition 1, C’s beliefs lead to 
a strategy of always acquitting, and the prospect of acquittal is sufficient to deter P from 
entering. In these circumstances, remedies for Fourth Amendment violations are irrelevant, and 
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so this class of equilibria continues to exist under both a tort liability regime and an exclusionary 
rule regime:  
Proposition 1´´: ΓER has a “passive” perfect Bayesian pooling equilibrium, identical to that 
characterized in Proposition 1 
Proof: See proof of Proposition 1. 
 
 Now consider the case where both types of P enter. The most important change caused by 
the ER regime is that PB can no longer follow a strategy of not investigating, and then planting. 
Were this approach followed, no search warrant could be produced at trial, and so the 
(purported) evidence would be excluded and the defendant acquitted. To obtain a conviction, PB 
must investigate (and therefore expend effort at cost k). If probable cause is not found, a warrant 
cannot be obtained, and there is no benefit to planting evidence on a suspect. On the other hand, 
if probable cause is found, then a search warrant is obtained (recalling that the magistrate cannot 
distinguish between PB and PG per se). Once the warrant is issued, however, PB has an incentive 
to always plant evidence on the suspect against whom the warrant was obtained. This incentive 
arises most clearly when ρ < s (i.e. the effort costs of planting are strictly lower than those of 
carrying out a genuine search). However, if C is anticipated to convict, the incentive exists even 
when ρ = s, because planting enables PB to obtain convictions against every suspect against 
whom probable cause is found, rather than simply those who are actually guilty. 
 Consider the inference problem faced by C when a trial occurs. The probability that PG 
will end up making an arrest is (as before) (1 – β)φg. The probability that PB will make an arrest, 
however, is lower than in Γ0, as an arrest in ΓER requires that probable cause has been found. 
Thus, the probability that PB will make an arrest is βφ. Consequently, the probability that a given 
police officer is of the good type is given by the expression: 
βϕϕβ
ϕβ
+−
−
g
g
)1(
)1(                                                      (6) 
If this probability exceeds q – i.e. if the following condition 
Condition 2: q
g
g >+−
−
βϕϕβ
ϕβ
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)1(  
is satisfied, then C will always convict. These beliefs thus sustain an equilibrium in which both 
types of P enter: this is the active pooling equilibrium of the game under the ER regime. 
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Proposition 2´´: Suppose that assumptions A1-A3 and Condition 2 hold. Then, ΓER has an 
“active” perfect Bayesian pooling equilibrium, where the equilibrium strategies are: 
   σG* = {J = 1; S = 1|F, S = 0|not F; A = 1|G, A = 0|not G} 
   σB* = {J = 1; S = 0; R = 1|F, S = 0|not F; A = 1} 
   σC* = Convict 
  C’s beliefs are 
βϕϕβ
ϕβµ +−
−=
g
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and the equilibrium payoffs are: 
   uG* = φ(g – s) – k 
uB* = φ(1 – ρ) – k 
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*  
Proof: Given the equilibrium strategy profile for P, the belief µ* is clearly correct (see the 
argument in the text). Given µ*, from Eq. (3), C’s expected payoff is given by: 
uC* = Pr[defendant is guilty].0 + Pr[defendant is innocent].(– q) 
         = )(
)1(
q
g
−+− βϕϕβ
βϕ  
which gives the equilibrium expected payoff uC* above i.e. uC* = – (1 – µ*)q. Thus, σC = 
Convict is optimal for C because the payoff from acquitting is 
  uC = Pr[defendant is guilty].( – (1 – q)) + Pr[defendant is innocent].(0) 
       = – (1 – q)µ* 
Condition 2 (i.e. µ* > q) implies that this is lower than uC*.  
In equilibrium, PG incurs the investigation cost k (as J = 1), and has probability φg of obtaining a 
conviction, while the search cost s is incurred with probability φ; this gives the equilibrium uG*. 
PB also incurs the investigation cost k (as J = 1), and obtains a conviction with probability φ (i.e. 
whenever probable cause is found), while incurring the planting cost ρ (also with probability φ); 
this gives the equilibrium uB*. Given C’s beliefs µ* and strategy σC*, it is optimal for each type 
of P to play the equilibrium strategy. Consider a deviation by PG to a strategy σG = {J = 0; S = 0; 
A = 0}; this would lead to a payoff uG = 0, whereas the payoff from playing σG* is φ(g – s) – k > 
0 (by A2). Consider a deviation by PB to a strategy σB = {J = 0; S = 0; R = 0; A = 0}; this would 
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lead to a payoff of uB = 0, whereas the payoff from playing uB* is φ(1 – ρ) – k > 0 (by A2, 
because φ(1 – ρ) – k > φ(g – s) – k). A deviation by PB to PG’s strategy (i.e. σB = {J = 1; S = 1|F, 
S = 0|not F; R = 0; A = 1|G, A = 0|not G}) would also not be profitable, as φ(1 – ρ) – k > φ(g – s) 
– k (as ρ ≤ s and g < 1 by assumption). Thus, this is an equilibrium. End of Proof. 
 
The intuition here is very similar to that for Proposition 2. What is noteworthy, however, is that 
the ER regime substantially reduces the scope for PB to plant evidence, and forces bad police to 
incur investigation costs that could be avoided in the basic game, and under TL. However, ER 
does not lead to any separating equilibria: 
Proposition 3´´: Given the assumptions above, there exists no separating equilibrium of ΓER. 
Proof: Analogous to proof of Proposition 3. 
 
The intuition here (as before) is that whenever entry is profitable for PG, it will also be profitable 
for PB (as the latter incurs a (weakly) lower cost of planting, ρ, relative to the former’s cost of 
search s, and also because PB has a higher ex ante probability of obtaining a conviction than does 
PG). As PG has no credible means of distinguishing itself from PB, a separating equilibrium is 
impossible (however, see Section 6 for an analysis of the situation where costs of investigation 
differ for the two types). 
 Having characterized the equilibrium outcomes in three games – Γ0, ΓTL, and ΓER – it 
remains to compare the properties of these equilibria. The existence of the same passive pooling 
equilibrium in each of these games makes it difficult to compare the outcomes of instituting 
different Fourth Amendment remedies.11 However, one approach is to focus on the active 
pooling equilibria in each regime. It is only in these equilibria that any police investigations, 
arrests and trials occur at all, and so these equilibria may be argued to be more relevant (since in 
practice investigations, arrests and trials are all observed, and would presumably continue to be 
observed under any realistic institutional structure). The results in Section 4 showed that the TL 
regime leads to identical outcomes to the basic game Γ0 (where there is no Fourth Amendment 
                                                 
11 Comparing Condition 1 and Condition 2, it is clear that the latter is satisfied for a larger subset of the parameter 
space than is the former. Thus, it could be argued that an active pooling equilibrium can be supported more easily 
under ER than under TL. However, whether this is a benefit from the standpoint of C (and of society) depends 
crucially on the value of the arbitrary parameter v, and so cannot be determined with any confidence. 
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remedy). Thus, the (active pooling equilibrium) outcomes of Γ0 and ΓTL can be considered 
together, and contrasted with the (active pooling equilibrium) outcome of ΓER.  
Let  denote the equilibrium expected payoff of C in the active pooling 
equilibria of Γ
ER
C
TL
CC uuu  and  ,
0
0, ΓTL, and ΓER, respectively. Then: 
Proposition 4: Restricting attention to equilibria where arrests are made (i.e. to active pooling 
equilibria), u  (i.e. the court’s payoff is strictly higher in ΓTLCC
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(by the definitions of the parameters given earlier). End of Proof. 
 
This implies that the ER regime leads to a higher level of welfare for C. As discussed earlier, C’s 
payoff can be interpreted as a proxy for social welfare (at least for the welfare derived by society 
from accuracy in criminal trials), and so it could be argued that the ER regime leads to a higher 
level of social welfare, in this particular respect. This constitutes the paper’s main result, and 
shows that there exist circumstances in which the ER regime may be superior (from the 
standpoint of accuracy in criminal adjudication) to a TL regime. 
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6) Extensions 
 6.1) Heterogeneous Costs of Investigation 
 The preceding analysis has assumed that both types of P face the same effort cost k of 
undertaking an investigation. This appears reasonable as a basic assumption, because there does 
not seem to be any compelling reason why one type is likely to find investigation more or less 
costly than the other. However, it may be argued that in some circumstances the good type may 
not only be a better police officer in terms of being unwilling to plant evidence, but may also be 
superior in terms of investigative skills (for instance, the bad type’s willingness to plant may 
arise from an inability to solve crimes through legitimate methods). While such an argument is 
not necessarily compelling in general, it is nonetheless of some interest to analyze the case where 
the bad type faces a higher effort cost of investigation than does the good type. 
 Let kG and kB be the investigation costs of PG and PB, respectively, and suppose that kG < 
kB. Furthermore, suppose that assumptions A2 and A3 hold for k = kG (so that it is optimal for PG 
to enter when it is anticipated that C will convict). For kB, the following assumption is made: 
A4: kB > 1 
A4 implies that it is never optimal for PB to enter and investigate (even if C is anticipated to 
convict). Note that A4 is slightly stronger than required, but it is simpler to formulate the 
assumption in this way. 
 The assumptions above entail that kG and kB are sufficiently different (for sufficiently 
small differences in these costs, the results derived in previous sections would be unchanged). 
Even when they hold, however, the equilibria of Γ0 and ΓTL derived in Sections 3 and 4 are 
unaffected by the heterogeneity in investigation costs. Recall that in these equilibria, PB’s 
equilibrium behavior involves either not entering, or entering and not investigating (J = 0 in all 
cases). Thus, the investigation cost is not incurred in equilibrium. Under the assumption of 
heterogeneous costs made here, deviation to any strategy that involves investigation (J = 1) 
becomes even less profitable for PB than under the assumptions made in Sections 3 and 4; 
however, equilibrium behavior is unaffected. Thus, the results concerning Γ0 and ΓTL are robust 
to assuming that PB’s investigations costs are higher. 
 This robustness does not apply, however, to ΓER. Recall that the active pooling 
equilibrium of ΓER involves PB investigating (and hence incurring the effort cost of doing so). 
Thus, when kG and kB are sufficiently different, PB will no longer be willing to pool with PG, and 
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instead will prefer not to enter (as, under the ER regime, entry requires that the investigation 
costs be expended in order to obtain a warrant and secure a conviction). In these circumstances, 
the active pooling equilibrium of ΓER no longer exists; instead, there exists a perfectly separating 
equilibrium in which PG enters while PB does not: 
Proposition 5: Suppose that A1 holds, that A2 and A3 apply to kG, and that A4 applies to kB; 
then, there exists a perfectly separating equilibrium of ΓER, where the equilibrium strategies are: 
   σG* = {J = 1; S = 1|F, S = 0|not F; A = 1|G, A = 0|not G} 
   σB* = {J = 0; S = 0; R = 0; A = 0} 
   σC* = Convict 
  C’s beliefs are µ* = 1, and the equilibrium payoffs are: 
   uG* = φ(g – s) – kG 
uB* = 0 
uC* = 0 
Proof: Given P’s strategy, C’s beliefs are clearly correct (i.e. only PG enters, so any defendant 
who is arrested and tried is guilty). Given these beliefs, it is optimal for C to convict: the 
equilibrium expected payoff is 0, while the expected payoff from acquitting is – (1 – q) < 0. 
Given C’s beliefs and strategy, P’s equilibrium strategy is optimal. Suppose PG were to deviate 
to a strategy that involves not entering: {J = 0; S = 0; A = 0}. This would give a payoff of 0, 
whereas the equilibrium payoff is φ(g – s) – kG > 0 (by A2). Suppose PB were to deviate by 
switching to a strategy that involves entering and planting (as in the Proposition 2´´ equilibrium): 
{J = 1; S = 0; R = 1|F, S = 0|not F; A = 1}. This would give a payoff of φ(1 – s) – kB < 0 (by 
A4), whereas the equilibrium payoff is 0. It is also not profitable for PB to deviate by adopting 
PG’s strategy: {J = 1; S = 1|F, S = 0|not F; R = 0; A = 1|G, A = 0|not G}. This would lead to a 
payoff of φ(g – s) – kB < 0 (by A4). Thus, this is an equilibrium. End of Proof. 
 
In this equilibrium, C’s payoff (and hence society’s payoff from accuracy in criminal 
adjudication) is at the maximum possible level. Thus, the earlier conclusions concerning the 
superiority of the ER regime (in Section 5) are substantially reinforced when different types of P 
face heterogeneous costs. Moreover, in these circumstances, the informational assumptions 
required concerning the warrant process can be relaxed (relative to the assumptions of Section 
5). Recall that the magistrate issuing search warrants was assumed in Section 5 to be able to 
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observe whether or not probable cause was found. When kG and kB are sufficiently different, all 
that is required for the separating equilibrium is that the magistrate be able to observe whether or 
not an investigation occurred (the finding of probable cause, as well the cost incurred in the 
investigation can both be P’s private information). Thus, heterogeneity in investigation costs 
substantially strengthens the case for the superiority of the ER regime; however, this superiority 
can be established (as in Section 5) even with an identical k, and (as noted above) there is no 
compelling reason why the heterogeneity assumptions made here would always be true.12 
 6.2) Criminal Liability for Planting Evidence 
 In the analysis so far, there has been no mention of the possibility that PB may face 
criminal liability for planting evidence and framing suspects. These activities are of course 
illegal, and so this section considers the consequences of extending the model in this direction. 
Incorporating criminal liability into the model is straightforward, and involves essentially the 
same setup as the game with tort liability (ΓTL in Section 4 above). The main difference is that 
the second court is now also a criminal court, and it is possible for the state to prosecute police 
officers for planting evidence on suspects. This court can be assumed to have the same payoff 
function as the civil court in Section 4 (given by Eq. (5)), except that it will generally require a 
higher standard of proof to convict the police officer than the civil court would require to award 
damages against the police officer for a Fourth Amendment violation. This means, however, that 
the results of Section 4 apply a fortiori to this case: if there is a sufficient likelihood of planting 
to convict P, then there would never be a sufficient likelihood of guilt to convict the suspect who 
is arrested by the same P. That is, the prospect of acquittal of the suspect will always be 
sufficient to deter PB from entering and planting, so the existence of criminal liability for 
planting will not have any additional deterrent effect on this behavior. Consequently, none of the 
results derived above in Sections 3-5 would be affected by the existence of criminal liability for 
P for planting evidence.13 
  
 
                                                 
12 Note however that, even if the cost differences went the other way (i.e. kG > kB), there could never be a “bad” 
separating equilibrium where PB enters and plants while PG does not enter; C would be certain to acquit in such 
circumstances, and, moreover (given criminal liability for planting), PB’s planting would be detected with certainty. 
13 Of course, in reality, it may be that there are circumstances in which P may be prosecuted successfully for 
planting evidence (e.g. if there is an unanticipated discovery of evidence of planting after the initial trial). However, 
the main point here is that, in this simplified framework, it is possible to ignore the effects of criminal liability.  
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6.3) Separating the Warrant Requirement from the Exclusionary Rule 
 In characterizing the alternative institutional structures associated with Fourth 
Amendment remedies, a TL regime has been contrasted with an ER regime. However, the latter 
has combined the warrant requirement and the exclusionary rule. This reflects current Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence, but it is not conceptually necessary that the two be linked. Note that 
in ΓER, evidence is never excluded in equilibrium. Moreover, evidence would be excluded (off 
the equilibrium path) only in cases where C infers a sufficiently high likelihood that P is of the 
bad type (and hence that the evidence is unreliable because it has been planted). Thus, the 
exclusionary rule per se has no independent effect: C would discount the purported evidence 
even in the absence of a requirement to exclude it. This means that all the results relating to ΓER 
would be unaffected if the exclusionary rule itself did not exist, as long as a warrant requirement 
was in place. 
 In reality, of course, there are many reasons why reliable evidence may be excluded 
under an ER regime (such as mistakes by good types of P). Even if evidence is unreliable, 
moreover, juries may not always be able to infer this (due for example to cognitive biases or 
limited attention), and so it may be optimal to exclude the evidence. Abstracting from such 
considerations, however, the model of the ER regime in this paper yields a significant insight: 
the particular benefit of the ER regime identified here (that it can deter the planting of evidence 
by police because of the requirement that there is some auditing of the investigation prior to 
search, through the warrant process) is due primarily to the warrant requirement and not the 
exclusionary rule per se. Thus, it is possible to envisage a system in which the warrant 
requirement stands by itself. The warrant requirement itself does not of course include any 
remedy for warrantless searches, but courts could appropriately discount the value of evidence 
obtained without a warrant to take into account the possibility of it having been planted. In 
effect, acquittal becomes the remedy when this probability is sufficiently high. Alternatively, the 
warrant requirement could be combined with tort liability for police officers who carry out 
unreasonable searches, a regime that would also offer protection to individuals who may be 
harassed by the police by being targeted for search, but without being framed. All the results 
obtained in Sections 5 and 6.1 above for ΓER would also hold in these regimes. 
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7) Discussion and Conclusion 
 The discussion of Fourth Amendment remedies among law and economics scholars (and, 
increasingly, among constitutional criminal procedure scholars) has tended towards a consensus 
that a system of tort liability is superior on a number of grounds (such as efficiency and 
conformity with the intentions of the framers) to the current regime that combines a warrant 
requirement and an exclusionary rule (albeit with many exceptions). The aim of this paper has 
been to develop an asymmetric information model of the process of criminal investigation, 
search, arrest and trial that demonstrates that there are circumstances in which the latter regime is 
preferable according to the (widely accepted) criterion of accuracy in adjudication. In particular, 
when some subset of police officers are willing to plant evidence on suspects (rather than to 
pursue truth-seeking investigations), the use of the warrant requirement and exclusionary rule 
provides a mechanism for auditing police investigations at a stage prior to search. By reducing 
the opportunities to plant evidence, it reduces the incidence of false convictions due to planting 
(although this is not, of course, the kind of abuse it is designed to remedy).  
 The remainder of this section briefly discusses some caveats to the model and its 
conclusions. First, the model assumes that the “good” type of police cannot produce evidence 
(either about the facts of the case, or about their character) at trial to distinguish themselves from 
the “bad” type. While this may seem unrealistic, nonetheless, the model’s basic conclusions hold 
as long as the types are indistinguishable to some degree from the perspective of the court; that 
is, the “good” type would always have to be able to distinguish itself perfectly to change the 
nature of the results.  
The model also assumes that the judge who decides whether to issue warrants can 
accurately observe the results of the police investigation (or, in the heterogeneous-cost variant, at 
least whether an investigation occurred). If this were not the case, or if the judge were to collude 
with the police and always issue warrants, then the outcomes under the two remedies would be 
identical. However, as long as the judge has some ability to verify investigations, and some 
degree of independence, the basic conclusions of the model hold.  
It has been assumed in the model that officers of the “good” type never carry out 
unreasonable searches. In reality, they may make good faith errors and thereby commit Fourth 
Amendment violations (without being involved in planting evidence). This could be incorporated 
into the model, but its effect is to reduce the payoff to the “good” type from investigating. Thus, 
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it would reduce the fraction of “good” types who would enter in an active pooling equilibrium, 
and change the cutoff probability above which the court is willing to convict; however, the 
results would not be fundamentally altered. Even if the exclusionary rule were to deter good faith 
errors “excessively” (relative to tort liability), the accuracy-in-adjudication effect identified by 
the model would still operate. 
In the comparison across the two Fourth Amendment remedies, the standard of 
reasonableness has been held fixed. If the tort liability regime involves a more socially efficient 
standard of reasonableness, then that would qualify some of the conclusions of the model. 
However, this would be an argument not for abandoning the warrant requirement and 
exclusionary rule, but rather for modifying the standard of evidence required for warrants to be 
issued. 
It should be emphasized that this paper has not sought undertake a general social welfare 
analysis of the alternative remedies. This would require the incorporation of factors such as the 
effects on crime levels, the utility of police officers, and the administrative costs of the court 
system. Rather, the focus has been on one specific (and relatively uncontroversial) aspect of 
social welfare – the accuracy of courts’ conviction and acquittal decisions. 
Finally, it may be thought that the model takes too pessimistic a view of police 
motivation. Note, however, that the model assumes that the basic agency problem between the 
public and the police (of motivating police to expend effort to seek convictions, rather than to 
shirk) has been solved. The remaining problem arises from asymmetric information between 
police and the public regarding the details of police practices and the evidence against suspects 
(and it seems a reasonable assumption that such an information asymmetry exists). Thus, this 
model is in some respects less pessimistic about police motivation than some existing models of 
police corruption (e.g. Bowles and Garoupa, 1997; Polinsky and Shavell, 2001) that assume that 
police are motivated by monetary gain in seeking bribes from suspects. Moreover, the model’s 
basic conclusions hold even if the fraction of police willing to plant evidence is very small. Note 
also, in conclusion, that the approach adopted here can be placed in the context of the “public 
choice” tradition in economics that models public officials as self-interested actors. 
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Table 1: Notation 
Symbol Definition 
A Indicator variable (= 1 if P arrests, 0 otherwise) 
C Court (which tries the suspect, if one is arrested by P) 
D > 1 Tort damages (potentially) assessed against P 
F The event that “probable cause” is found 
G The event that evidence of guilt is found, conditional on “probable cause” 
having been found 
g є (0, 1) Probability of G 
I Indicator variable (= 1 if C convicts a suspect, 0 otherwise) 
J Indicator variable (= 1 if P investigates, 0 otherwise) 
k, kG > 0, kB > 1  Cost (to P, PG, PB) of investigation 
P, PG, PB Police officer; good type; bad type 
q C’s threshold of “reasonable doubt” 
R Indicator variable (= 1 if PB plants, 0 otherwise) 
S Indicator variable (= 1 if P searches, 0 otherwise) 
s > 0 Cost (to P) of search  
T Civil court (which tries the case against P for a Fourth Amendment violation, 
if such a suit is brought, and if P is subject to tort liability) 
t є [1/2, 1) T’s threshold for “preponderance of the evidence” 
u, uG, uB P’s payoff; PG’s payoff; PB’s payoff 
uC C’s payoff 
uT T’s payoff 
v > 0 Cost to C (negative of C’s payoff) if no trial occurs 
β є (0, 1) Fraction of bad P’s 
Γ0 The game without any remedy for Fourth Amendment violations 
ΓER The game with a warrant requirement and exclusionary rule 
ΓTL The game with tort liability for P 
θ є {Good, Bad} P’s type space 
µ  C’s belief about P’s type (= Pr[θ = Good]) 
ρ є (0, s] Cost (to PB) of planting 
σB PB’s strategy set: {JB; SB; RB; AB} 
σC C’s strategy set: {Convict, Acquit} 
σG PG’s strategy set: {JG; SG; AG} 
φ є (0, 1) Probability of F 
 
Figure 1: Timing of Γ0 
Stage 0 Nature chooses P’s type θ є {Good, Bad} 
Stage 1 P chooses J (i.e. decides whether to investigate) 
 If J = 1, nature chooses F (i.e. whether “probable cause” is found)  
Stage 2 P chooses S (i.e. whether to search); PB chooses R (i.e. whether to plant)  
 If S = 1, nature chooses G (i.e. whether evidence of guilt is found) 
Stage 3 P chooses A (i.e. whether to arrest) 
Stage 4 If A = 1, a trial occurs and C chooses a verdict (from the set {Convict, Acquit})
 
